Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: Evidence from China by LI, Kai et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy
7-2009
Ownership, institutions, and capital structure:
Evidence from China
Kai LI
Heng YUE
Singapore Management University, hyue@smu.edu.sg
Longkai ZHAO
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2009.07.001
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Marketing Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LI, Kai; YUE, Heng; and ZHAO, Longkai. Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: Evidence from China. (2009). Journal of
Comparative Economics. 37, (3), 471-490. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1698
Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: Evidence from China
Kai Li a,*, Heng Yue b, Longkai Zhao b
a Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, Canada BC V6T 1Z2
bGuanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, PR China
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 14 July 2008
Revised 5 July 2009
Available online 18 July 2009
JEL classiﬁcation:
G32
G15
G18
Keywords:
Foreign ownership
Leverage
Long-term debt
Marketization
Short-term debt
State ownership
a b s t r a c t
Li, Kai, Yue, Heng, and Zhao, Longkai—Ownership, institutions, andcapital structure: Evi-
dence from China
We employ a unique data set to explore the role of ownership structure and institutional
development in debt ﬁnancing of non-publicly traded Chinese ﬁrms. We show that state
ownership is positively associated with leverage and ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt, while
foreign ownership is negatively associated with all measures of leverage. Surprisingly,
ﬁrms in better developed regions are associated with reduced access to long-term debt,
suggesting the availability of alternative ﬁnancing channels and the tightening of the lend-
ing standards under the on-going banking reform. The combination of ownership struc-
tures and institutions explains up to 6% of the total variation in ﬁrms’ leverage decisions,
while ﬁrm characteristics alone explain no more than 8% of the variation. Further, we show
that non-state-owned ﬁrms tend to have lower total and short-term debt than their state-
owned counterparts in less developed regions. Finally, we show that state-owned ﬁrms’
easy access to long-term debt is positively associated with long-term investment and neg-
atively associated with ﬁrm performance. Journal of Comparative Economics 37 (3) (2009)
471–490. Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall,
Vancouver, Canada BC V6T 1Z2; Guanghua School of Management, Peking University,
Beijing 100871, PR China.
 2009 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.
1. Introduction
Since China introduced economic reforms in the late 1970s, it has been growing more rapidly than any western economy.
The increasing importance of China in the world economy contrasts with our limited understanding of how China and, in
particular, Chinese ﬁrms have achieved remarkable success in expanding growth. Cull and Xu (2005) suggest that access
to external ﬁnance in the form of bank loans is associated with more proﬁt reinvestment among Chinese ﬁrms. More broadly,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) and many others demonstrate a link between credit
market development and economic growth. Harvey et al. (2004) show that debt capital creates value for ﬁrms with extreme
agency problems through reducing overinvestment. On the other hand, Krugman (1999) points out that debt ﬁnancing
encourages corporate risk-taking and leads to instability in emerging markets. In this paper, we examine debt ﬁnancing
behavior of Chinese ﬁrms using a new ﬁrm-level database.
The bulk of the literature has focused on the tradeoff between interest tax shields and expected bankruptcy costs to
explain ﬁrm debt ﬁnancing decisions. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1986) posit that capital structure also depends
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on the existence of asymmetric information and agency costs. The extent to which these costs can be mitigated by ownership
structures and ﬁnancial contracts depends on both ﬁrm characteristics and institutions in the economy that facilitate
monitoring and enforcement of ﬁnancial contracts. Prior work shows that a country’s development of its legal and institu-
tional framework matters in local ﬁrms’ capital structure decisions. When the legal system is inefﬁcient or costly to use,
short-term debt is more likely to be employed than long-term debt (see for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1999)). In terms of the role of ownership structures in corporate decisions, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) suggest that direct
state ownership is often associated with the pursuit of political objectives at the expense of other stakeholders in the ﬁrm.
Consistent with their view, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) show that state-owned ﬁrms are more highly leveraged and per-
form more poorly than comparable private ﬁrms. We posit that, ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the
quality of regional institutional development and local ﬁrms’ use of long-term debt, and a positive association between ﬁrm
state ownership and our measures of leverage.
Our data covers the entire population of predominantly unlisted manufacturing ﬁrms tracked by the Chinese statistical
authorities. We show that the capital structure choices of Chinese ﬁrms are affected by the same ﬁrm characteristics, such as
size and proﬁtability, as listed ﬁrms in developed countries. There is also a strong industry effect in capital structure deci-
sions, and ﬁrms in more concentrated industries are associated with lower levels of leverage.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrm ownership structures are an important factor in determining Chinese ﬁrms’ capital structure decisions.
State ownership is positively associated with leverage and ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt, while foreign ownership is neg-
atively associated with all of our measures of leverage. Our result on state ownership is consistent with the Chinese govern-
ment’s dual roles as the (majority) shareholder of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as the owner of all major banks.
Foreign-owned ﬁrms are subject to lower corporate tax rates than their domestically-owned counterparts. We show that
ﬁrms with high foreign ownership are not as highly levered as their Chinese-owned counterparts, consistent with the trade-
off theory.
The above ﬁndings on the Chinese ﬁrms’ capital structure decisions are mostly consistent with the existing literature. We
also make a number of new observations. First, we show that disparities in regional institutional development matter for
ﬁrms’ leverage decisions. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms in better developed regions are found to be associated with a lower likelihood
of employing long-term debt. This suggests that banks have gradually begun to apply economic criteria in their lending deci-
sions under current banking reforms; thus, ﬁrms in well developed regions cannot borrow as much long-term as before. Fur-
ther, when a region improves the quality of its institutional environment, alternative long-term ﬁnancing instruments such
as equity, become available, and, as a result, local ﬁrms reduce their reliance on long-term debt ﬁnancing. Second, we ﬁnd
that the combination of ownership structures and institutional development has the same explanatory power as that of ﬁrm
characteristics in explaining ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt, highlighting the importance of considering ownership and insti-
tutions when studying capital structure in emerging countries like China. Third, we show that non-state-owned ﬁrms tend to
have lower total and short-term debt than their state-owned counterparts in less developed regions. Finally, we show that
state-owned ﬁrms’ easy access to long-term debt is positively associated with long-term investment and negatively associ-
ated with ﬁrm performance.
Our paper contributes to the literature along the following dimensions. First, our study focuses on debt ﬁnancing of non-
publicly traded ﬁrms, while past research on capital structure choices in developing countries has mainly focused on the
largest public ﬁrms in those countries (for example, Booth et al. (2001), Harvey et al. (2004), Fan et al. (2006), and Giannetti
(2003) is a notable exception). Large listed companies have easier access to both domestic and international ﬁnancial mar-
kets than their non-listed counterparts, and, as a result, their capital structure decisions are less subject to the institutional
constraints imposed by their home countries.
Second, our paper presents fresh evidence on the interaction between ownership structures and institutions to affect
leverage decisions. Existing studies have examined the role of state ownership (in ﬁrms, such as in Dewenter and Malatesta
(2001) and in banks, such as in Sapienza (2004)) in corporate decisions, and the role of good institutions in encouraging the
use of long-term debt ﬁnancing (such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999)). A priori, however, it is not clear how own-
ership structures interact with the institutional framework to inﬂuence capital structure decisions.
Finally, we also make a methodological contribution by conducting inter-region studies within one country to explore the
effect of institutions on corporate decisions. The advantage of our approach, in comparison to cross-country studies, is that
our result on the effect of institutions on capital structure is free of contamination due to country differences in accounting
rules, taxation, and bankruptcy laws.
The existing literature has presented limited evidence on Chinese ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices. Huang and Song (2002) exam-
ine the capital structure decisions of listed Chinese ﬁrms. Brandt and Li (2003), and Cull et al. (2009) ﬁnd evidence suggesting
that private ﬁrms in China are denied access to bank loans and that they resort to more expensive trade credits instead. Cull
and Xu (2003) show that bank ﬁnance is positively linked to both proﬁtability andmeasures of SOE reform. Allen et al. (2005)
conclude that alternative ﬁnancing channels based on reputation and relationships support the growth of China’s private
sector. Fan et al. (2008) show a signiﬁcant decline in connected companies’ leverage and debt maturity subsequent to the
arrest of their related bureaucrats. Using survey data, Firth et al. (2009) ﬁnd that state-owned banks extend loans to bet-
ter-performing and better-governed private ﬁrms. Further, having the state as a minority owner helps ﬁrms obtain bank
loans, especially for large ﬁrms and ﬁrms located in regions with a less developed banking sector. Different from these earlier
studies, our sample contains the population of manufacturing ﬁrms and is thus much more comprehensive than either listed
ﬁrms or ﬁrms surveyed within certain geographic regions.
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The plan of the paper is as follows. We review related institutional background and develop our hypotheses in the next
section. Section 3 discusses our sample and variable construction. Section 4 presents our main results and provides interpre-
tation, and Section 5 conducts some robustness checks and additional investigation. Section 6 concludes.
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development
In this section, we ﬁrst brieﬂy review China’s bankruptcy laws and corporate tax codes which have important implica-
tions for Chinese ﬁrms’ capital structure choices. We then develop speciﬁc hypotheses that are motivated by prior literature.
2.1. Bankruptcy laws in China
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (henceforth the Bankruptcy Law) ﬁrst came into effect
in 1988, and was primarily enacted to deal with bankruptcies of SOEs. In 1991, the National People’s Congress issued the
amended 19th chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure: Debt Repayment Order in Legal Entity Bankruptcy (henceforth the
Code), which provided a direct basis for handling the bankruptcies of non-state-owned enterprises and brought the bank-
ruptcies of all enterprises in China into the legal system.
There were many issues associated with implementing the Bankruptcy Law (Li, 2001; Wu and Liu, 2008; Fan et al.,
2009). First, the ownership structure of SOEs was not clear, making it difﬁcult to identify the real debtor. Second, insolvent
ﬁrms must pay employee claims before they paid creditors, regardless of whether the creditors had secured claims or not.
Thus creditors often had difﬁculty recovering debt. Even state-owned banks, which were the main creditors of SOEs, were
often hit hard by SEO bankruptcies. These banks therefore often opposed bankruptcy ﬁlings. Third, SOEs under bankruptcy
were given preferential treatment such as bad debt write-offs, while non-SOEs were denied such preferential treatment.
Finally, both the Bankruptcy Law and the Code were vague about enterprises with foreign ownership, providing little guid-
ance on the rights of foreign owners and creditors. Allen et al. (2005), and Fan et al. (2009) conclude that ineffective bank-
ruptcy implementation makes the threat and penalty for bad ﬁrm performance non-credible. In particular, SOEs face
smaller bankruptcy costs than ﬁrms of other ownership because they expect the government to bail them out in hard
times.
In 2007, China promulgated an entirely new Bankruptcy Law. The new law deals with all types of ﬁrms that are not eco-
nomically viable and removes many of the barriers to liquidation of SOEs.
2.2. Corporate taxes in China
Interest payments on debt are tax deductible expenses in China. In its 1994 tax reform, China introduced two different
corporate income tax regimes for domestic ﬁrms and ﬁrms with foreign ownership. The corporate tax rate was 33% for
domestic ﬁrms, and 15–24% for foreign ﬁrms: the lower tax rate of 15% applied to foreign ﬁrms established in the coastal
regions and within the special economic zones. Foreign ﬁrms also enjoyed various tax breaks. For the ﬁrst 2 years of becom-
ing proﬁtable, there was no corporate tax, and for the next 3 years, the applicable tax rate was half of the statutory rate. For-
eign ﬁrms could also receive tax refund up to 40% of their corporate tax if their proﬁt was reinvested. According to Gordon
and Li (2003), corporate tax rates in China are broadly in line with those observed in other emerging countries. However, the
dual-track tax regime imposes heavier tax burdens on domestic ﬁrms.
In 2007, the National People’s Congress passed the new Corporate Income Tax Law that stipulates a single income tax rate
of 25% for both domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
2.3. Literature review and our hypotheses
Our empirical analysis is motivated by three strands of the capital structure literature. First, the tradeoff theory states that
optimal capital structure is determined by ﬁrms balancing tax savings from debt against deadweight bankruptcy costs.
Empirically, ﬁrm characteristics are used to proxy for the costs and beneﬁts of debt (see for example, Titman and Wessels
(1988), and Frank and Goyal (2009)). The ﬁrm-level controls in our empirical analysis are based on this literature.
Second, the literature on state ownership shows that while state ownership enhances ﬁrms’ access to debt, it has adverse
effects on managerial incentives and ﬁrm performance (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Khwaja and Mian, 2005); and lend-
ing decisions of state-owned banks are politically motivated (Sapienza, 2004; Dinç, 2005).
Unique to China, the role of government in corporate ﬁnancing decisions is pivotal given its dual roles as a (majority)
shareholder of (state) ﬁrms as well as the owner of all major banks. After more than 20 years of economic reforms, the state
sector remains a formidable part of the national economy, especially in terms of employment and ﬁxed assets. Maintaining
employment and social stability, instead of proﬁt maximization in SOEs, has been the primary goal of the Chinese govern-
ment. Further, China’s ﬁnancial system is dominated by a large but inefﬁcient banking system that is mainly controlled by
the four largest state-owned banks. Over our sample period, the government still puts pressure on the banking system to
lend primarily to state enterprises, and stipulates reference loan rates from which banks rarely deviate, with little regard
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for ﬁnancial considerations (Gordon and Li, 2003; Allen et al., 2005; García-Herrero et al., 2005). Financing by ﬁrms through
stock listing and issuance of bonds is a recent phenomenon and small in magnitude.1
As a result, a controlling government stakeholder is expected to use SOEs and state banks to achieve these other policy
goals, even though they may conﬂict with banks’ own interests. Gordon and Li (2003), and Allen et al. (2005) show that Chi-
nese SOEs receive a disproportionately large share of the credit extended by large state banks. Moreover, soft budget con-
straints and expected government bailouts of troubled SOEs further increase the supply of bank loans to these enterprises
(Brandt and Li, 2003). Our ﬁrst hypothesis thus is:
H1: There is a positive relation between ﬁrm state ownership and our measures of leverage.
On the other hand, control by other types of investors can weaken the government’s ability to intervene in corporate mat-
ters. Sun and Tong (2003), and Bai et al. (2004) show that issuing shares to foreign investors is associated with higher market
valuation and better ﬁrm performance. Cull and Xu (2005) ﬁnd that the share of private ownership has a positive effect on
proﬁt reinvestment rates. Given that these ﬁrms are better run, the state-owned banks and their ultimate owner, the gov-
ernment, have an incentive to lend any excess funds to better-performing private borrowers, and to foreign borrowers in
particular, to diversify their creditor base (Firth et al., 2009). Moreover, foreign ﬁrms may be interested in domestic loans
due to preferential interest rates and/or for hedging purposes. On the other hand, foreign ﬁrms also have access to offshore
capital and they pay lower corporate taxes (as compared to domestic ﬁrms), and private ﬁrms may rely on alternative ﬁnanc-
ing channels based on reputation and relationships (Allen et al., 2005). A priori, it is not clear how foreign and private own-
ership affect ﬁrms’ access to debt ﬁnancing.
Finally, our research is also motivated by the literature on cross-country studies of capital structure. This literature gen-
erally ﬁnds that country factors are important (for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995)). And more recent studies on
emerging markets conclude that institutions that can facilitate enforcement of contracts are important for the develop-
ment of credit markets. In particular, better legal rules and better protection of creditors are associated with more
long-term debt ﬁnancing (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Giannetti, 2003). Different from these studies, our mea-
sure of the quality of the institutional framework is with respect to different regions within one country – China. Our sec-
ond hypothesis thus is:
H2: There is a positive association between the level of regional institutional development and local ﬁrms’ access to long-
term debt.
3. Sample overview and variable construction
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) started to track manufacturing ﬁrms in thirty 2-digit SIC industries since 1998, but
it did not report long-term and short-term debt separately until 2000, so our sample period is from 2000 to 2004.
Following GAAP, the NBS deﬁne long-term liabilities as liabilities with maturity greater than 1 year including long-term
bank loans, and long-term accounts payable; and short-term liabilities as liabilities with maturity less than and equal to 1
year including short-term bank loans, and accounts payable.2 Statistics from the People’s Bank of China show that the split
between short-term and long-term lending by ﬁnancial institutions was 70:30 in 2000 and 53:47 in 2004.
Our data includes all SOEs regardless of their annual sales, and other manufacturing enterprises reporting more than ﬁve
million yuan (approximately $600,000) of annual sales. We drop observations with negative values of total assets, total lia-
bilities, and sales. To deal with outliers and the most extremely mis-recorded data, we winsorize all ﬁrm-level variables at
the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. Our ﬁnal sample has 417,068 ﬁrm-year observations.
3.1. Variable construction
We calculate a ﬁrm’s leverage ratio (LEV) as its total liabilities divided by total assets. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1999) show that ﬁrms in developing countries tend to employ more short-term ﬁnancing, reﬂecting the greater depen-
dence of these ﬁrms on short-term debt and trade credit. We compute a ﬁrm’s short-term debt ratio (STD) as its short-
term liabilities divided by total assets. We also construct an indicator variable, the LTD dummy, which is set equal to one
1 In 2004, bank loans represented 83% of funds raised by the non-ﬁnancial sector, while stocks were only 5% and bonds 12% (11% for government bonds and
1% for corporate bonds). The ‘‘Big Four” state-owned banks represent a 55% share of total assets in the banking system (García-Herrero et al., 2005). According
to Gordon and Li (2003), and Bai et al. (2004), state enterprises, especially the large ones, beneﬁted substantially from rapid growth in equity issuance and
general public enthusiasm for equity markets. In contrast, most other businesses in China typically obtain external ﬁnancing from banks rather than through
issuance of securities.
2 China’s accounting system began its reform in 1992. Since then, China’s accounting standards for listed ﬁrms have been moving gradually towards the
North American Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
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if the ﬁrm has long-term liabilities in a speciﬁc year, and zero otherwise. To the extent that ﬁrms with access to long-term
ﬁnancing are better equipped to make long-term investments, this last variable is an important dimension of capital struc-
ture policies.
A unique feature of the NBS data is that it contains detailed information on ﬁrm ownership structures over time, based on
the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by different types of investors, such as the state, individuals, and foreigners.3 In
our empirical analysis, we employ two ownership variables: the fraction of ownership by the state, and the fraction of owner-
ship by foreign investors.4
Our data on the extent of institutional development across regions in China comes from the National Economic Research
Institute’s marketization index (Fan and Wang, 2004, see our Appendix A for a detailed description). This index has been
used by Wang et al. (2008), and Firth et al. (2009), and many others to measure regional institutional development. Higher
scores of the index suggest greater institutional development.
We employ the following ﬁrm characteristics to explain leverage decisions. Firm size is expected to be positively cor-
related with leverage, given that larger ﬁrms have a lower probability of bankruptcy and lower costs (relative to ﬁrm va-
lue) in the event of bankruptcy (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Frank and Goyal, 2009). We measure ﬁrm
size as annual sales in millions of 2003 RMB Yuan. Proﬁtability is expected to be negatively correlated with leverage fol-
lowing the asymmetric-information argument of Myers and Majluf (1984) that ﬁrms only turn to debt ﬁnancing when
internal funding is exhausted. We measure proﬁtability as earnings before taxes divided by total assets and adjusted
by its industry median. Asset tangibility is a proxy for the availability of collateral, and is expected to be positively asso-
ciated with leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009). We measure asset tan-
gibility as total ﬁxed assets divided by total assets. The maturity of assets is expected to be positively correlated with the
maturity of liabilities (Barclay and Smith, 1995). We measure asset maturity as the sum of (current assets/total
assets)  (current assets/cost of goods sold) and (ﬁxed assets/total assets)  (ﬁxed assets/depreciation), divided by 1000.
Firms that compete in the same product market tend to adopt similar capital structures (Frank and Goyal, 2009). We com-
pute annual industry-level leverage measures based on 2-digit SIC codes. Finally, Brander and Lewis (1986) show that
product market conditions inﬂuence capital structure. We use the Herﬁndahl index based on ﬁrm sales to capture the ex-
tent of industry concentration.
3.2. Summary statistics
Table 1 provides basic summary statistics. Panel A shows that the average (median) leverage ratio for our sample ﬁrms is
57 (59)%. Strikingly, the average (median) short-term debt ratio is 50 (51)%. About 35% of our sample ﬁrms employ long-term
debt.5 Comparing the above numbers to statistics reported in other studies (such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999),
Booth et al. (2001), and Giannetti (2003)), it is clear that Chinese ﬁrms have higher levels of leverage and much higher propor-
tions of short-term debt in their capital structures than do ﬁrms in other countries.
Panel B presents summary statistics of ﬁrm characteristics. We show that there is signiﬁcant variation across our sample
ﬁrms in terms of annual sales. The average (median) sales is RMB 70.8 (17.2) million yuan, and the standard deviation of
sales is RMB 511.4 million yuan. The distribution of sales is severely right skewed. Our sample ﬁrms are proﬁtable, with
the average industry-adjusted ROA at 4.4%. On average, close to 35% of ﬁrm assets are tangible assets. The average maturity
of ﬁrm assets is 0.022. Finally, the very small value of the Herﬁndahl index suggests that most industries are highly
competitive.
Panel C presents summary statistics for our ownership and institutional variables. We show that the average state own-
ership of sample ﬁrms is 11.9% while the median state ownership is zero. In fact, only 15% of sample ﬁrms have any state
ownership at all, and most state ownership is concentrated in the largest and smallest sample ﬁrms (untabulated). Condi-
tioning on state ownership being non-trivial, the average (median) state ownership is 78.1 (100)%. The average (median) for-
eign ownership is 18 (0)%. About a quarter of sample ﬁrms have non-trivial foreign ownership, and foreign investors prefer
investing in large ﬁrms (untabulated). Conditional on that there is non-zero foreign ownership, the average (median) foreign
ownership is 71.3 (90)%. The average (median) score of marketization is 7.36 (7.59). The top three most developed provinces
3 One caveat to our analysis is that our ownership variables are measured at the ﬁrm level: they are not ultimate ownership. Fan et al. (2007) document the
emergence of pyramidal ownership among newly listed local government-controlled ﬁrms in China. However, it is not clear to what extent pyramids are
organized among ﬁrms owned by foreigners, individuals, and others. Moreover, among our sample of predominantly unlisted ﬁrms, only about 10% of them are
controlled by the state. Thus, our paper still presents important and valid evidence on the role of ownership structures in capital structure decisions.
4 Our data has a total of six ownership variables: ownership by the state, private sector, Hong Kong–Macau–Taiwan investors, foreign investors, collective,
and legal persons. For parsimony, as well as to avoid multicollinearity, we opt to focus on the two ownership variables that are of greatest interest from a policy
perspective: state and foreign ownership, where the latter combines ownership by Hong Kong–Macau–Taiwan investors with that by foreign investors. We call
ownership by the rest four groups as non-state ownership. It is worth noting that our main results remain unchanged if we employ more reﬁned ownership
variables.
5 We ﬁnd that the median leverage ratio for the 700 listed ﬁrms in our sample is around 45%, lower than that for the population of ﬁrms in our sample,
suggesting that the listed ﬁrms prefer to ﬁnance through public equity instead of debt (untabulated). Over 80% of the listed ﬁrms have access to long-term debt,
in comparison to only 35% of our sample ﬁrms having long-term debt. It appears that the listed ﬁrms are not only less indebted, but they also employ more
long-term debt than their unlisted counterparts.
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are Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Fujian, all in the coastal regions, and the bottom three worst developed provinces are Tibet,
Ningxia, and Qinghai.
The correlation matrix in Panel D indicates that there is a high correlation of 0.85 between the leverage and short-
term debt ratios, reﬂecting the fact that most of the liabilities on the Chinese ﬁrms’ balance sheets are short-term. There
is a negative correlation of 0.12 between the short-term debt ratio and the long-term debt dummy. Firm size is highly
correlated with ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt. Proﬁtability is negatively associated with all measures of leverage. Asset
tangibility is negatively associated with leverage and short-term debt, but positively associated with ﬁrms’ access to
long-term debt. Both asset maturity and industry concentration have close to zero correlations with all measures of
leverage. State ownership is signiﬁcantly and positively associated with leverage and ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt.
Foreign ownership exhibits signiﬁcant and negative correlations with all leverage measures. Marketization is negatively
associated with leverage and the availability of long-term debt, but positively associated with short-term debt. Finally,
there is a negative correlation between state and foreign ownership, and ﬁrms in well developed regions are associated
with low state ownership and high foreign ownership, suggesting some possible interaction between institutional devel-
opment and ownership characteristics. Given that omitted variable bias in univariate correlations can mask the true rela-
tions between the variables, next we employ multiple regressions to examine the determinants of various leverage
measures.
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Mean Std. deviation 5th Percentile Median 95th Percentile
Panel A: capital structure measures
LEV 0.567 0.243 0.125 0.589 0.928
STD 0.503 0.248 0.078 0.511 0.896
LTD dummy 0.354
Panel B: ﬁrm characteristics
Firm size 70.79 511.4 3.75 17.14 200.7
Proﬁtability 0.044 0.187 0.075 0.007 0.274
Asset tangibility 0.348 0.210 0.058 0.324 0.723
Asset maturity 0.022 0.384 0.001 0.005 0.051
Industry concentration 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.011
Number of observations Mean Std. deviation 5th Percentile Median 95th Percentile
Panel C: ownership and regional development measures
State ownership 417,068 0.119 0.305 0.000 0.000 1.000
State ownership conditioning on it being positive 63,337 0.781 0.308 0.122 1.000 1.000
Foreign ownership 417,068 0.180 0.349 0.000 0.000 1.000
Foreign ownership conditioning on it being positive 105,085 0.713 0.320 0.210 0.900 1.000
Marketization 417,068 7.357 1.588 4.590 7.590 9.740
LEV STD LTD
dummy
Firm
size
Proﬁtability Asset
tangibility
Asset
maturity
Industry
concentration
State
ownership
Foreign
ownership
Panel D: the correlation matrix
STD 0.851
LTD dummy 0.175 0.120
Firm size 0.012 0.005 0.114
Proﬁtability 0.165 0.149 0.029 0.102
Asset tangibility 0.150 0.229 0.132 0.040 0.008
Asset maturity 0.002 0.011 0.018 0.012 0.007 0.135
Industry
concentration
0.008 0.006 0.028 0.116 0.010 0.040 0.003
State ownership 0.074 0.007 0.177 0.101 0.110 0.101 0.024 0.072
Foreign
ownership
0.170 0.108 0.167 0.190 0.059 0.030 0.011 0.015 0.161
Marketization 0.037 0.058 0.216 0.136 0.023 0.160 0.021 0.064 0.278 0.274
Our sample contains the population of manufacturing ﬁrms tracked by the NBS for the period 2000–2004. We drop observations with negative values of
total assets, total liabilities, and sales, and winsorize all ﬁrm-level variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. Our ﬁnal sample has 417,068
ﬁrm-year observations. LEV is measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. STD is the ratio of short-term liabilities over total assets. The LTD
dummy is set equal to one if the ﬁrm has long-term debt, and zero otherwise. Firm size is annual sales measured in millions of 2003 RMB Yuan.
Proﬁtability is earnings before tax divided by total assets adjusted by the industry median. Asset tangibility is total ﬁxed assets divided by total assets.
Asset maturity is the sum of (current assets/total assets)  (current assets/cost of goods sold) and (ﬁxed assets/total assets)  (ﬁxed assets/depreciation),
divided by 1000. Industry concentration is the Herﬁndahl index using ﬁrm sales. State ownership is the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by the
state. Foreign ownership is the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by foreign investors. The marketization index captures the regional institutional
development and is from Fan and Wang (2004). The Fan and Wang data is available for 1998–1999 and 2001–2002. We use the average of the 1999 and
2001 indices for our ﬁrms in 2000, and use the values of 2002 indices for our ﬁrms in years 2002–2004. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of capital
structure variables. Panel B presents descriptive statistics of ﬁrm characteristics. Panel C presents descriptive statistics of ﬁrm ownership and institu-
tional development measures. Panel D presents the correlation matrix. Given the large sample size, all correlations are signiﬁcant therefore we omit the
signiﬁcant levels.
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4. Main results
To examine Chinese ﬁrms’ capital structure decisions, we run the following reduced form regression:
Leverage Measureit ¼ aþ ft þ b1Firm Sizeit1 þ b2Profitabilityit1 þ b3Asset Tangibilityit1 þ b4Asset Maturityit1
þ b5Industry Concentrationit1 þ b6Industry Leverageit1 þ b7State Ownershipit1
þ b8Foreign Ownershipit1 þ b9Marketizationt1 þ eit: ð1Þ
For ﬁrm i in year t, Leverage Measure can be total leverage ratio (LEV), short-term debt ratio (STD), or the likelihood of having
long-term debt (LTD dummy).
Our basic empirical model in Eq. (1) is a panel data regression. We expect that ﬁrms within a province are more likely to
have similar characteristics and thus are more likely to be correlated with each other. This intra-province correlation has to
be taken into account in parameter estimation. We adopt robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial le-
vel. Robust standard errors turn out to be much larger than conventional estimates which assume independence across ﬁrm-
year observations and standard errors only assuming autocorrelation within the same ﬁrm, so our signiﬁcance tests are not
inﬂated by the large number of ﬁrm-year observations in our sample. Year dummies are included in all speciﬁcations to cap-
ture temporal effects.
4.1. Full sample results
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 presents regression results using the full sample and model speciﬁcation as given in Eq. (1).
Panel A presents the results when the dependent variable is the leverage ratio. We ﬁnd that ﬁrm size and asset maturity are
positively associated with leverage, whereas proﬁtability and asset tangibility are negatively associated with leverage. Firms
in more concentrated industries are associated with lower leverage, contrary to the prediction from Brander and Lewis
(1986), but consistent with predictions from the Bertrand (price) competition model of Showalter (1995) where demand
is uncertain, a better approximation of market conditions in China. There is a strong industry effect in leverage: ﬁrms in
industries with a high industry median leverage are associated with high leverage themselves. Given that existing capital
structure theories are developed to explain the ﬁnancing choices of public ﬁrms in the industrial world, it is actually striking
that the same set of ﬁrm characteristics has decent explanatory power for debt ratios of unlisted ﬁrms in an emerging
market.
Ownership appears to play an important role in ﬁrms’ capital structure decisions. State ownership is signiﬁcantly and
positively associated with leverage, consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis (H1). The economic signiﬁcance of this ﬁnding is
non-trivial: an increase in state ownership from the sample median to the 95th percentile is associated with an increase
in total debt by 3.3%. Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) show that SOEs are more highly levered. Sapienza (2004) ﬁnds that
state-owned banks tend to lend to large ﬁrms. In China, many large ﬁrms are SOEs, so our result is consistent with the ﬁnd-
ings in both papers. The dual roles of the Chinese government as the owner of SOEs and of the four largest domestic banks
result in investments of SOEs being supported by the government through heavily subsidized bank loans, leading to exces-
sive leverage in SOEs. In contrast, ownership by foreign investors is associated with lower leverage. An increase in ownership
by foreigners from the median to the 95th percentile is associated with a decrease in total debt by 12.6%. This is an econom-
ically signiﬁcant effect. Our results suggest that ﬁrms with high state ownership are inefﬁciently highly levered, while lower
corporate taxes associated with foreign ownership lead to lower leverage, consistent with the tradeoff theory. Finally, insti-
tutional development does not seem to matter for Chinese ﬁrms’ total leverage ratios.
Panel B presents estimation results where the dependent variable is the short-term debt ratio. Firm characteristics that
explain the total debt decision appear to play a similar role in the short-term debt decision. The exception is that asset matu-
rity is not signiﬁcantly associated with short-term debt; this is not surprising, given that short-term borrowing is not ex-
pected to be affected by ﬁrm long-term assets. State ownership is not signiﬁcantly associated with the short-term debt
ratio, while foreign ownership is negatively associated with the short-term debt ratio. These ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms with
high non-state ownership have difﬁculty in accessing long-term ﬁnancing, and, as a result, they rely more on short-term bor-
rowing relative to ﬁrms with high state ownership. Moreover, banks prefer to provide short-term loans to these ﬁrms so that
they can control any opportunistic behavior by entrepreneurs. As a result, state ownership does not show up signiﬁcantly in
the short-term debt regression. Finally, ﬁrms in well developed regions are associated with high short-term debt ratios, sug-
gesting that banks in well developed regions are more likely to lend on a short-term basis.6
Examining the factors that inﬂuence ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt sheds some interesting light beyond our analyses on
different leverage ratios. Panel C of Table 2 reports the marginal effects from a probit regression.7 We ﬁnd that ﬁrm size and
asset tangibility are positively, whereas proﬁtability is negatively, associated with ﬁrms’ use of long-term debt. Firms in more
concentrated industries are associated with reduced access to long-term debt. There is again a strong industry effect in ﬁrms’
access to long-term debt. Consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis (H1), state ownership is signiﬁcantly and positively associated
6 Fan et al. (2006) offer another potential explanation for our ﬁnding of high levels of short-term debt in Chinese ﬁrms. They argue that the main supplier of
capital in China, the banks, have short-term liabilities (deposits) and may thus have a comparative advantage in holding short-term debt.
7 The industry-level leverage measure in the probit analysis is constructed as the frequency of ﬁrms having long-term debt in that industry for a given year.
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Table 2
Determinants of capital structure.
Dependent variable: LEV Full speciﬁcation Firm
characteristics only
Ownership
variables only
Institutional
variable only
Ownership/institutional
variables only
Panel A: determinants of total leverage
Firm characteristics
Firm size 0.012*** 0.004*
[0.000] [0.065]
Proﬁtability 0.230*** 0.216***
[0.000] [0.000]
Asset tangibility 0.189*** 0.181***
[0.000] [0.000]
Asset maturity 0.013** 0.014**
[0.036] [0.015]
Industry concentration 1.067*** 0.414
[0.002] [0.361]
Industry median 0.420*** ***
[0.000] [0.000]
Ownership structures
State ownership 0.033** 0.037** 0.042**
[0.046] [0.041] [0.023]
Foreign ownership 0.126*** 0.114*** 0.118***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Institutional factor
Marketization 0.001 0.005 0.004
[0.882] [0.355] [0.359]
Number of observations 417,068 417,068 417,068 417,068 417,068
R2 0.093 0.059 0.032 0.002 0.032
Panel B: determinants of short-term debt
Firm characteristics
Firm size 0.006*** 0.001
[0.004] [0.447]
Proﬁtability 0.207*** 0.195***
[0.000] [0.000]
Asset tangibility 0.257*** 0.260***
[0.000] [0.000]
Asset maturity 0.011 0.012
[0.152] [0.131]
Industry concentration 0.567* 0.424
[0.070] [0.393]
Industry median 0.476*** 0.528***
[0.000] [0.000]
Ownership structures
State ownership 0.005 0.007 0.010
[0.735] [0.723] [0.603]
Foreign ownership 0.101*** 0.078*** 0.095***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Institutional factor
Marketization 0.008 0.009 0.015**
[0.163] [0.248] [0.027]
Number of observations 417,068 417,068 417,068 417,068 417,068
R2 0.098 0.079 0.013 0.004 0.021
Dependent variable: LTD dummy Full
speciﬁcation
Firm
characteristics only
Ownership
variables only
Institutional
variable only
Ownership/institutional
variables only
Panel C: explaining the probability of having long-term debt
Firm characteristics
Firm size 0.071*** 0.048***
[0.000] [0.000]
Proﬁtability 0.165*** 0.148***
[0.001] [0.027]
Asset tangibility 0.222*** 0.261***
[0.000] [0.000]
Asset maturity 0.000 0.008***
[0.993] [0.009]
Industry concentration 2.394*** 0.389
[0.001] [0.569]
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with a ﬁrm’s likelihood of having long-term debt: an increase in state ownership from the median to the 95th percentile is asso-
ciated with an increase in the ﬁrm’s likelihood of getting long-term debt by 16.0%. In contrast, ownership by foreign investors is
negatively associated with ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt: an increase in foreign ownership from the median to the 95th
Table 2 (continued)
Dependent variable: LTD dummy Full
speciﬁcation
Firm
characteristics only
Ownership
variables only
Institutional
variable only
Ownership/institutional
variables only
Industry average frequency 0.514*** 0.966***
[0.000] [0.000]
Ownership structures
State ownership 0.160*** 0.216*** 0.168***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Foreign ownership 0.218*** 0.222*** 0.175***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Institutional factor
Marketization 0.041*** 0.063*** 0.045***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Number of observations 417,068 417,068 417,068 417,068 417,068
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.050 0.043 0.037 0.057
LEV STD LTD dummy
Panel D: ﬁxed effects results
Firm characteristics
Firm size 0.001 0.002 0.085***
[0.757] [0.393] [0.000]
Proﬁtability 0.123*** 0.106*** 0.283***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Asset tangibility 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.337***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Asset maturity 0.001 0.002 0.015***
[0.552] [0.382] [0.008]
Industry concentration 0.181 0.239 2.931***
[0.597] [0.576] [0.005]
Industry median/average frequency 0.083* 0.101* 0.596***
[0.067] [0.060] [0.001]
Ownership structures
State ownership 0.003 0.004 0.091***
[0.486] [0.409] [0.000]
Foreign ownership 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.389***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.000]
Institutional factor
Marketization 0.006 0.007 0.044***
[0.242] [0.125] [0.000]
Fixed effects YES YES NO
Number of observations 61095 61095 61095
R2/Pseudo R2 0.825 0.790 0.108
This table reports results from regressions of capital structure variables on ﬁrm characteristics, and ownership and institutional variables. Our sample
contains the population of manufacturing ﬁrms tracked by the NBS for the period 2000–2004. We drop observations with negative values of total assets,
total liabilities, and sales, and winsorize all ﬁrm-level variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. Our ﬁnal sample has 417,068 ﬁrm-year
observations. LEV is measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. STD is the ratio of short-term liabilities over total assets. The LTD dummy is set
equal to one if the ﬁrm has long-term liabilities, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of annual sales measured in millions of 2003 RMB
Yuan. Proﬁtability is earnings before tax divided by total assets adjusted by the industry median. Asset tangibility is total ﬁxed assets divided by total assets.
Asset maturity is the sum of (current assets/total assets)  (current assets/cost of goods sold) and (ﬁxed assets/total assets)  (ﬁxed assets/depreciation),
divided by 1000. Industry-level leverage measures are based on 2-digit SIC code and computed yearly. Industry concentration is the Herﬁndahl index using
ﬁrm sales. State ownership is the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by the state. Foreign ownership is the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by
foreign investors. The marketization index captures the regional institutional development and is from Fan and Wang (2004). The Fan and Wang data is
available for 1998–1999 and 2001–2002. We use the average of the 1999 and 2001 indices for our ﬁrms in 2000, and use the values of 2002 indices for our
ﬁrms in years 2002–2004. Year dummies are included in each regression but not reported. Panel A presents the regression results using LEV as the
dependent variable. Panel B presents the regression results using STD as the dependent variable. Panel C reports the marginal effects of a probit regression
using the LTD dummy as the dependent variable. The ﬁrst column presents the results from the full speciﬁcation. The second to the ﬁfth columns present
the model speciﬁcations with ﬁrm characteristics only, ownership variables only, institutional variable only, and ownership and institutional variables
combined, respectively. The reported P-values, below the coefﬁcient estimates in brackets, are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors adjusted to account for possible correlation within a province cluster. Panel D presents the ﬁxed effects regression results using a sub-sample of ﬁrms
that experience the largest change in ownership variables over the sample period.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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percentile is associated with a decrease in the ﬁrm’s likelihood of getting long-term debt by 21.8%. This evidence concurs with
our earlier discussion that the government still plays an important role in ﬁrms’ borrowing and banks’ lending decisions given
its dual capacities as owners of both the debtor (SOEs) and the creditor (the state banks). The net outcome is that SOEs have
better access to long-term debt than would be justiﬁed based on economic criteria, while ﬁrms characterized by other owner-
ship structures are more likely to rely on self-fundraising and/or foreign direct investment (Allen et al., 2005).
Contrary to our second hypothesis (H2), we ﬁnd that ﬁrms in better developed regions are associated with reduced ac-
cess to long-term debt. This result is in stark contrast to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and others showing that
better legal rules and better protection of creditors are associated with more long-term debt ﬁnancing. We offer the fol-
lowing justiﬁcations for our result. First, our result is consistent with Diamond’s (1991) argument that lenders engaged in
monitoring have an incentive to make short-maturity loans. Under current banking reforms, banks have begun to apply
economic criteria in their lending decisions and have strong incentives to monitor lenders. But, due to their lack of credit
risk management expertise, they are more likely to lend short-term. Second, we expect equity holders to be more sensitive
to investor protection than debtholders (primarily banks in China) due to their residual claimant status. When a region
improves its legal environment with respect to investor protection, equity investors in that region will be more willing
to offer long-term ﬁnancing than otherwise, and, as a result, ﬁrms in that region reduce their reliance on debt ﬁnancing.
Third, the more stringent enforcement of legal contracts during the on-going banking reform deters ﬁrms from excessive
borrowing as they have to worry about the consequences of default on outstanding loans. Finally, our measure of insti-
tutional development across regions in China is much broader than the creditor protection measure typically used in prior
work.
There is one caveat to our analysis thus far, that is, both ﬁrm ownership characteristics and regional institutional devel-
opment could be jointly determined in equilibrium while our analysis treats them as independent from each other. As a re-
sult, the coefﬁcients on ownership variables in Eq. (1) could capture the sum of direct effects of ownership on leverage
decision and indirect effects of ownership on institutional development, and vice versa. If ownership characteristics are af-
fected by regional institutional development, we expect this effect more likely to show up at the regional level of ownership,
that is, better developed regions are associated with a high average level of foreign ownership, and a low average level of
state ownership. By removing their respective regional means from the ownership variables, the coefﬁcients on the de-
meaned ﬁrm-level ownership measures will clearly capture the direct effects of ownership on leverage decisions. We
ﬁnd that our main results in Table 2 remain the same using the de-meaned ownership measures (results available upon
request).
4.2. Fixed effects results
The model speciﬁcation in Eq. (1) is essentially OLS. Due to time-invariant heterogeneity across ﬁrms and for better iden-
tiﬁcation, we would like to employ ﬁrm ﬁxed effects in our estimation.8 However, our key variables of interest: state and
foreign ownership, and regional institutional development, tend to change very slowly over time. In unreported analysis,
we ﬁnd that the 75th percentile of time series standard deviation for state and foreign ownership variables is still zero, while
the 75th percentile of time series standard deviation for the marketization index is small compared to its mean.
So we sort our sample into different quintiles based on the extent of temporal variation in the two ownership variables,
and form a sub-sample of ﬁrms whose state ownership or foreign ownership experiences the largest temporal change over
our sample period. Panel D reports the ﬁxed effects regression results when the dependent variables are the leverage and
short-term debt ratios. To examine ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt, we just report the probit regression results for the same
sub-sample. We adopt robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level.
Most of our key results regarding ownership and institutional development remain. We ﬁnd that state ownership is pos-
itively associated with ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt, while foreign ownership is negatively associated with all measures of
leverage. The exception is that state ownership is no longer signiﬁcantly associated with the leverage ratio once ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects are included. Overall, the ﬁxed effects results lend further support for our conclusion that both ownership and insti-
tutions matter in Chinese ﬁrms’ leverage decisions.
4.3. The importance of ownership and institutions in leverage decisions
So far, our evidence has demonstrated the signiﬁcance of considering ownership structures and the quality of the insti-
tutional framework in non-listed Chinese ﬁrms’ capital structure choices. To get a sense of the extent to which our ownership
and institutional variables inﬂuence leverage decisions, in Table 2, Panels A–C, from the second column to the ﬁfth column,
we present four alternative speciﬁcations to Eq. (1) by including, separately, ﬁrm characteristics, ownership characteristics,
the quality of institutional development, and the combination of ownership and institutional variables.
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the full model speciﬁcation explains 9.3% of the total variation in leverage ratios. R2s for the
alternative speciﬁcations indicate that the ownership and institutional variables alone explain 3.2% and 0.2%, respectively, of
the variation in total debt. The combination of ownership and institutional factors contributes to about one third of the
8 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this investigation.
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Table 3
The interaction effects.
Marketization
Bottom tercile Top tercile
Panel A: summary statistics
Capital structures
LEV 0.568 0.546
(0.591) (0.563)
STD 0.474 0.501
(0.474) (0.510)
LTD dummy 0.474 0.260
(0.000) (0.000)
Ownership structures
State ownership 0.221 0.047
(0.000) (0.000)
Foreign ownership 0.069 0.272
(0.000) (0.000)
Institutional factor
Marketization 5.474 9.004
(5.570) (9.100)
Number of observations 137562 134070
LEV STD LTD dummy
Bottom
tercile
Top
tercile
Diff. Bottom
tercile
Top
tercile
Diff. Bottom
tercile
Top
tercile
Diff.
Panel B: capital structure decisions, grouped by institutional development
Firm characteristics
Firm size 0.010*** 0.015** 0.005** 0.003* 0.009 0.008** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.012
[0.000] [0.037] [0.020] [0.066] [0.166] [0.030] [0.000] [0.000] [0.444]
Proﬁtability 0.253*** 0.163 0.090 0.236*** 0.149 0.088 0.089** 0.208 0.169
[0.000] [0.284] [0.365] [0.000] [0.258] [0.300] [0.014] [0.238] [0.348]
Asset tangibility 0.166*** 0.198*** 0.032 0.260*** 0.246*** 0.020 0.252*** 0.174*** 0.037**
[0.000] [0.010] [0.215] [0.000] [0.003] [0.437] [0.000] [0.000] [0.029]
Asset maturity 0.004*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.001 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.027***
[0.007] [0.010] [0.000] [0.573] [0.006] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000]
Industry concentration 1.034*** 0.309 0.726 0.102 0.296 0.445 5.249*** 0.736* 5.875***
[0.004] [0.666] [0.272] [0.789] [0.768] [0.595] [0.000] [0.050] [0.000]
Industry median/average
frequency
0.364*** 0.260*** 0.107 0.355*** 0.372* 0.179 0.465*** 0.523*** 0.127
[0.000] [0.009] [0.666] [0.000] [0.068] [0.351] [0.000] [0.000] [0.326]
Ownership structures
State ownership 0.064*** 0.007 0.071** 0.043*** 0.042 0.085*** 0.161*** 0.197*** 0.084***
[0.000] [0.846] [0.025] [0.001] [0.334] [0.008] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004]
Foreign ownership 0.108*** 0.124*** 0.016 0.068*** 0.096** 0.031 0.254*** 0.192*** 0.020
[0.000] [0.008] [0.262] [0.000] [0.034] [0.132] [0.000] [0.000] [0.268]
Institutional factor
Marketization 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.011* 0.020 0.018 0.057*** 0.019 0.010
[0.625] [0.881] [0.839] [0.087] [0.663] [0.194] [0.001] [0.654] [0.635]
Number of observations 137562 134070 271632 137562 134070 271632 137562 134070 271632
R2/Pseudo R2 0.088 0.088 0.090 0.098 0.089 0.096 0.070 0.078 0.108
This table reports results from regressions of capital structure variables on ﬁrm characteristics, and ownership and institutional variables, grouped by the
level of institutional development. Our sample contains the population of manufacturing ﬁrms tracked by the NBS for the period 2000–2004. We drop
observations with negative values of total assets, total liabilities, and sales, and winsorize all ﬁrm-level variables at the 1% level in both tails of the
distribution. Our ﬁnal sample has 417,068 ﬁrm-year observations. LEV is measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. STD is the ratio of short-
term liabilities over total assets. The LTD dummy is set equal to one if the ﬁrm has long-term liabilities, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural
logarithm of annual sales measured in millions of 2003 RMB Yuan. Proﬁtability is earnings before tax divided by total assets adjusted by the industry
median. Asset tangibility is total ﬁxed assets divided by total assets. Asset maturity is the sum of (current assets/total assets)  (current assets/cost of goods
sold) and (ﬁxed assets/total assets)  (ﬁxed assets/depreciation), divided by 1000. Industry-level leverage measures are based on 2-digit SIC code and
computed yearly. Industry concentration is the Herﬁndahl index using ﬁrm sales. State ownership is the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by the state.
Foreign ownership is the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by foreign investors. The marketization index captures the regional institutional devel-
opment and is from Fan and Wang (2004). The Fan and Wang data is available for 1998–1999 and 2001–2002. We use the average of the 1999 and 2001
indices for our ﬁrms in 2000, and use the values of 2002 indices for our ﬁrms in years 2002–2004. Year dummies are included in each regression but not
reported. The reported P-values, below the coefﬁcient estimates in brackets, are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted to
account for possible correlation within a province cluster. Panel A reports summary statistics of capital structure measures, ownership structures, and the
level of institutional development grouped by the level of institutional development. Mean and median (in parenthesis) are reported. Panel B reports
estimation results when the sample is grouped by the level of the marketization index.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
K. Li et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics 37 (2009) 471–490 481
explanatory power of our full model speciﬁcation. In contrast, the ﬁrm variables alone explain 5.9% of the variation. The
above analysis re-afﬁrms the important roles of ﬁrm ownership and institutions in capital structure decisions.
Panels B–C of Table 2 present the explanatory power of different sets of control variables for short-term debt and ﬁrms’
access to long-term debt, respectively. We ﬁnd that ownership and institutional variables combined explain 2.1% of the total
variation in short-term debt ratios, while ﬁrm characteristics alone explain 7.9% of the total variation. The relatively weak
explanatory power of ownership and institutional variables suggests that the decision on short-term debt ﬁnancing is mainly
based on the operational needs of the ﬁrm, instead of on ownership structures and institutional development.
Finally, the ownership and institutional variables together explain 5.7% of the total variation in the probability that a ﬁrm
has long-term debt (Panel C), while ﬁrm characteristics alone explain only 5%. La Porta et al. (1997, 2002) argue that, in an
emerging country with no well-developed legal framework, capital structures are not just ﬁrms’ own choices, but are subject
to government interference and various institutional constraints. Gordon and Li (2003), Allen et al. (2005), and García-Her-
rero et al. (2005) further contend that these market frictions are especially acute in the case of long-term debt where inﬂu-
ence from the government is strongest. We show that the effect of ownership and institutional variables on leverage is
greatest in ﬁrms’ long-term debt decisions, conﬁrming the conjecture from the above studies.
Next, we investigate how ownership and institutional development interact to affect ﬁrms’ capital structure decisions: is
the role of ownership in capital structure decisions strengthened in regions with poor institutional development? Answer to
this question help identify the speciﬁc channels through which ownership and institutional development exert inﬂuences on
corporate leverage decisions.
4.4. The interaction effects
Despite growing evidence on the effects of ownership and institutions on capital structure decisions, surprisingly, there is
a lack of evidence on how ownership structures and institutions interact to affect leverage decisions (Firth et al. (2009) is a
notable exception). A priori, we expect that the effect of ownership on capital structure decisions is greater in areas with
poorly developed institutions.
In standard setups, the above relation can be explored by adding interaction terms between ownership variables and the
level of institutional development to our base model in Eq. (1). In our very large panel data set, with the measure of insti-
tutional development slowly changing over time and varying only at the regional level, the interaction terms between own-
ership variables and the level of institutional development are highly correlated with their ownership components. We opt
to employ sub-samples to investigate the interaction effects. Speciﬁcally, each year we ﬁrst sort the marketization index into
terciles, and then assign our sample ﬁrms into their respective terciles.
Table 3, Panel A presents the summary statistics across the sub-samples. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms in better developed regions
employ similar levels of debt and short-term debt compared to ﬁrms in less developed regions, whereas ﬁrms in better
developed regions have a much lower likelihood of using long-term debt than their counterparts in less developed regions.
Better developed regions are associated with ﬁrms with lower state ownership and higher foreign ownership. The above
summary statistics are suggestive of the effects of interaction between ownership and institutions on capital structure deci-
sions. We present the regression results in Panel B.
We show that in regions with better institutional development, ﬁrm size plays a more important role in leverage and
short-term debt decisions than in regions with worse institutional development. Surprisingly, in regions with better insti-
tutional development, asset maturity matters more in total and short-term debt decisions, while it is negatively associated
with the availability of long-term debt. Firms in less competitive industries are associated with a higher likelihood of using
long-term debt. Finally, state ownership has a stronger effect on leverage and short-term debt in poorly developed regions,
while we observe a much stronger effect on ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt in better developed regions. Our ﬁndings suggest
that in less developed regions, foreign and private ﬁrms tend to have lower total and short-term debt than their state-owned
counterparts. In contrast, in better developed regions, ﬁrms of different ownership structures tend to have similar total and
short-term debt.
In summary, we show that ownership and institutional development interact in important ways to affect capital structure
decisions: the role of state ownership in ﬁrms’ capital structure decisions is strengthened in less developed regions. Overall,
our results provide insight on why and how ownership structures and institutions matter in capital structure decisions.
5. Additional investigation
In this section, we ﬁrst implement various robustness checks on our main results. Then we explore the relation between
leverage, investment, and ﬁrm performance. Finally, we examine capital structure decisions of the smallest ﬁrms in our
sample.
5.1. Robustness checks
Our sample includes manufacturing ﬁrms covered by the NBS encompassing six ownership sub-samples: state-, private-,
Hong Kong-Macau-Taiwan-, foreign-, collective-, and legal person-owned. It has been noted in the literature (Allen et al.,
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2005 for example) that collective ownership is an ambiguous arrangement that is somewhere between state and private
ownership, and the ultimate ownership behind legal person ownership could be either by private entities or by the state.
As a result, our measure of state ownership might not be precise for these two ownership sub-samples and the interpretation
of our results on state ownership might be fraught with measurement errors. In Table 4, Panel A, we present our main regres-
sion results using a sample excluding the collective and legal person ownership sub-samples. It is clear that all our main
results remain unchanged with a sub-sample where state ownership is unambiguously deﬁned.
We have also implemented some other robustness checks and they are summarized below (results are available upon
request). First, we explore alternative measures of institutional and macroeconomic development in capital structure deci-
sions, such as the banking development index and the legal environment index that are constituents of the marketization
index compiled by the National Economic Research Institute (Fan and Wang, 2004), the deregulation measure by Démruger
et al. (2002), and the size of the state sector by employment: our main results on ownership and institutions remain
unchanged.
Second, we examine whether our results are robust with respect to alternative sample formation. Our sample includes all
SOEs, regardless of the size of their annual sales, and other ﬁrms with annual sales exceeding ﬁve million yuan. To make our
SOE sample comparable to other ﬁrms, we also estimate our leverage models by including only SOEs that meet the ﬁve mil-
lion yuan cutoff and ﬁnd that most of our main results stay the same.
Third, we also run collapsed cross-sectional regressions in which the time-series average for each variable is computed,
resulting in only one observation per ﬁrm. The shortcoming of using the collapsed version is that we sacriﬁce temporal vari-
ations. Nonetheless, all of our main results remain unchanged, in particular, with respect to the role of ownership structures
and institutions in capital structure decisions.
Finally, we run yearly cross-sectional regressions to detect if there are any systematic differences over time in the role of
ownership and institutions in capital structure decisions. Over our sample period of 2000–2004, China has deepened and
intensiﬁed its reforms of SOEs and state-owned banks. Nonetheless, there is no material change over time in the effects
of ownership and institutions on capital structure.
5.2. Leverage, investment, and ﬁrm performance
One important beneﬁt of long-term debt is that it allows ﬁrms to invest more without worrying about short-term ﬁnanc-
ing costs.1 In Table 4, Panel B, we examine whether ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt is positively associated with long-term
investment, and whether the use of short-term debt curtails long-term investment. The dependent variable is long-term
investment divided by total assets. The key variables of interest are the lagged levels of and changes in capital structure
variables.
We show that ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt is signiﬁcantly and positively associated with long-term investment, while
the leverage and short-term debt ratios are signiﬁcantly and negatively associated with long-term investment. We note that
the above results hold when the leverage variables are measured in either lagged levels or changes. In unreported analysis,
we ﬁnd that state-owned ﬁrms tend to invest signiﬁcantly more than foreign and private ﬁrms. And using a dummy variable
for ﬁrms’ long-term investment gives similar results.
Given the above ﬁndings, it is natural to explore the performance effects of leverage. In Panel C, we present our investi-
gation using both ROA and returns on sales (ROS) as the dependent variables and the lagged levels of capital structure vari-
ables as our variables of interest.
We show that the leverage and short-term debt ratios are consistently and negatively associated with future ﬁrm perfor-
mance measured 1-year later, while ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt is not signiﬁcantly associated with future performance.
In unreported analysis, we ﬁnd that state-owned ﬁrms signiﬁcantly underperform foreign and private ﬁrms. And using fu-
ture performance measured 3-year later or changes in leverage variables does not change our main results.
We conclude that despite their easy access to bank loans, state-owned ﬁrms are not as efﬁciently run as foreign and pri-
vate ﬁrms.
5.3. Capital structure decisions of small ﬁrms
Small ﬁrms in China represent the fastest growing sector in the economy. The scale of this sector in terms of sales and
assets is catching up to those of large and medium enterprises. Understanding how ownership structures and institutional
factors affect ﬁrms of different sizes has clear policy implications. Our data offer a rare opportunity to explore the capital
structures of small unlisted ﬁrms in an emerging country.
The NBS assigns ﬁrms into large, medium, and small categories. For the manufacturing industries, a ﬁrm is classiﬁed as
large (medium) if its number of employees exceeds 2000 (between 300 and 2000), its annual sales exceeds 300 million yuan
(approximately $37 million) (between 30 and 300 million yuan), and its total assets exceeds 400 million yuan (approxi-
mately $50 million) (between 40 and 400 million yuan). If a ﬁrm fails to meet all of these criteria simultaneously, it is clas-
siﬁed down by one size category. Given the large number of small ﬁrms in the sample, we further break them down into
quintiles using sales.
Table 5, Panel A presents the summary statistics for different size sub-samples. We ﬁnd that medium ﬁrms have the high-
est levels of leverage and short-term debt, while large ﬁrms have the highest likelihood of employing long-term debt. The
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Table 4
Additional investigation.
LEV STD LTD dummy
Panel A: excluding collective and legal person sub-samples
Firm characteristics
Firm size 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.062***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Proﬁtability 0.220*** 0.199*** 0.182***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.000]
Asset tangibility 0.212*** 0.270*** 0.216***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Asset maturity 0.018** 0.017* 0.001
[0.010] [0.065] [0.888]
Industry concentration 1.156*** 0.779** 1.204**
[0.002] [0.016] [0.024]
Industry median/average frequency 0.355*** 0.446*** 0.488***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Ownership Structures
State ownership 0.041** 0.006 0.192***
[0.035] [0.767] [0.000]
Foreign ownership 0.130*** 0.107*** 0.165***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Institutional factor
Marketization 0.000 0.007 0.035***
[0.951] [0.224] [0.000]
Number of observations 259076 259076 259076
R2/Pseudo R2 0.105 0.103 0.110
Panel B: capital structure and long-term investment
Capital structure
LEV 0.013***
[0.000]
STD 0.013***
[0.000]
LTD dummy 0.007***
[0.000]
D LEV 0.002**
[0.019]
D STD 0.002**
[0.015]
D LTD dummy 0.001**
[0.031]
Firm characteristics
Firm size 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Proﬁtability 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Firm age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Industry concentration 0.262*** 0.274*** 0.290*** 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.334***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Ownership structure
State ownership 0.004*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004* 0.004* 0.004**
[0.010] [0.015] [0.047] [0.053] [0.053] [0.049]
Foreign ownership 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Institutional factor
Marketization 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.627] [0.882] [0.832] [0.814] [0.813] [0.794]
Number of observations 362,891 362,891 362,404 217,883 217,883 217,343
R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
ROA ROS
Panel C: capital structure and future ﬁrm performance
Capital structure
LEV 0.008*** 0.004**
[0.009] [0.019]
STD 0.009** 0.004**
[0.015] [0.016]
LTD dummy 0.001 0.001
[0.439] [0.272]
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capital structure decisions exhibited by different quintiles among small ﬁrms are fairly similar. It is clear that high state own-
ership is concentrated in the largest and smallest ﬁrms in the sample, while high foreign ownership tends to concentrate in
the large ﬁrms and the largest quintile of small ﬁrms. Finally, small ﬁrms tend to locate in better developed regions, while
large ﬁrms tend to locate in less developed regions.
Panel B presents regression results using the leverage ratio as the dependent variable. Due to space constraints, we only
present regression results for the three quintiles of small ﬁrms in comparison to large and medium ﬁrms. We show that ﬁrm
characteristics affect ﬁrms of different sizes in similar ways in terms of their capital structure decisions. Moreover, it appears
that state ownership is not signiﬁcantly associated with the leverage decision of the largest quintile of small ﬁrms, possibly
due to the close to zero state ownership in these ﬁrms. It appears that the explanatory power of our model speciﬁcation is
poorest for small ﬁrms.
The results on short-term debt ﬁnancing are presented in Panel C. We show that state ownership is positively associated
with short-term debt decisions for large ﬁrms, whereas foreign ownership is strongly and negatively associated with small
ﬁrms’ use of short-term debt.
Panel D of Table 5 examines ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt. Foreign ownership is strongly and negatively associated with
large ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt, while the effect of foreign ownership on small ﬁrms’ access to long-term debt is much
smaller. This suggests that small ﬁrms beneﬁt from foreign ownership in their access to long-term debt.
Overall, we conclude that ownership structures and institutional development affect the capital structure decisions of dif-
ferent-sized ﬁrms in very similar ways, with the exception that small ﬁrms appear to beneﬁt from the certifying role of for-
eign ownership in obtaining long-term debt ﬁnancing.
Table 4 (continued)
ROA ROS
Firm characteristics
ROA 0.716*** 0.716*** 0.720***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ROS 0.630*** 0.630*** 0.632***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Firm size 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Firm age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Industry concentration 0.181 0.174 0.177 0.003 0.006 0.004
[0.101] [0.107] [0.106] [0.964] [0.930] [0.958]
Ownership structure
State ownership 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.026***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Foreign ownership 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Institutional factor
Marketization 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.071] [0.082] [0.060] [0.705] [0.754] [0.662]
Number of observations 417,068 417,068 416,537 417,068 417,068 416,537
R2 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.380 0.380 0.380
This table reports results from regressions of capital structure variables on ﬁrm characteristics, and ownership and institutional variables, and from
regressions of long-term investment and future ﬁrm performance on capital structure variables. Our sample contains the population of manufacturing ﬁrms
tracked by the NBS for the period 2000–2004. We drop observations with negative values of total assets, total liabilities, and sales, and winsorize all ﬁrm-
level variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. Our ﬁnal sample has 417,068 ﬁrm-year observations. LEV is measured as the ratio of total
liabilities over total assets. STD is the ratio of short-term liabilities over total assets. The LTD dummy is set equal to one if the ﬁrm has long-term liabilities,
and zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of annual sales measured in millions of 2003 RMB Yuan. Proﬁtability is earnings before tax divided by
total assets adjusted by the industry median. Asset tangibility is total ﬁxed assets divided by total assets. Asset maturity is the sum of (current assets/total
assets)  (current assets/cost of goods sold) and (ﬁxed assets/total assets)  (ﬁxed assets/depreciation), divided by 1000. Industry-level leverage measures
are based on 2-digit SIC code and computed yearly. Industry concentration is the Herﬁndahl index using ﬁrm sales. State ownership is the fraction of paid-
in-capital contributed by the state. Foreign ownership is the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by foreign investors. The marketization index captures
the regional institutional development and is from Fan and Wang (2004). The Fan and Wang data is available for 1998–1999 and 2001–2002. We use the
average of the 1999 and 2001 indices for our ﬁrms in 2000, and use the values of 2002 indices for our ﬁrms in years 2002–2004. Year dummies are included
in each regression but not reported. The reported P-values, below the coefﬁcient estimates in brackets, are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors adjusted to account for possible correlation within a province cluster. Panel A presents the regression results by excluding the collective and
legal person ownership sub-samples. Panel B presents the regression results when the dependent variable is long-term investment divided by total assets,
while the explanatory variables are measured in either 1-year lagged levels or changes. DLEV is the difference in leverage between year t  1 and t. DSTD is
the difference in short-term debt between year t  1 and t. DLTD dummy is the difference in long-term debt dummy between year t  1 and t. Panel C
presents the regression results when the dependent variables are ROA and ROS, while the explanatory variables are measured in 1-year lagged levels. ROA is
earnings before tax divided by total assets. ROS is earnings before tax divided by annual sales.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 5
Determinants of capital structure, grouped by ﬁrm size.
Large Medium Small Small
Quintile 5 Quintile 3 Quintile 1
Panel A: summary statistics
Capital structures
LEV 0.577 0.602 0.562 0.557 0.570 0.555
(0.594) (0.623) (0.583) (0.574) (0.594) (0.579)
STD 0.466 0.513 0.504 0.501 0.514 0.489
(0.465) (0.513) (0.514) (0.510) (0.527) (0.496)
LTD dummy 0.704 0.572 0.311 0.339 0.295 0.322
(1.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ownership structures
State ownership 0.358 0.238 0.093 0.053 0.063 0.224
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign ownership 0.235 0.214 0.173 0.279 0.167 0.079
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutional factor
Marketization 6.932 7.181 7.399 7.638 7.514 6.852
(7.020) (7.100) (7.590) (7.980) (7.980) (6.760)
Number of observations 18,221 41,031 357,806 71,560 71,557 71,564
Panel B: determinants of total leverage, grouped by ﬁrm size
Firm characteristics
Firm size 0.001 0.006** 0.013*** 0.009* 0.012* 0.024***
[0.910] [0.028] [0.000] [0.062] [0.054] [0.000]
Proﬁtability 0.568*** 0.583*** 0.218*** 0.197*** 0.294*** 0.318***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Asset tangibility 0.107*** 0.131*** 0.201*** 0.193*** 0.211*** 0.204***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Asset maturity 0.002 0.008** 0.018** 0.002 0.012*** 0.023***
[0.136] [0.030] [0.043] [0.517] [0.000] [0.001]
Industry concentration 1.244* 0.806 0.972*** 0.543 1.367*** 0.741
[0.068] [0.135] [0.009] [0.214] [0.009] [0.111]
Industry median 0.445*** 0.560*** 0.393*** 0.358*** 0.424*** 0.466***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Ownership structures
State ownership 0.034*** 0.025** 0.029* 0.023 0.014 0.038**
[0.002] [0.015] [0.090] [0.155] [0.462] [0.020]
Foreign ownership 0.111*** 0.139*** 0.126*** 0.105*** 0.138*** 0.136***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Institutional factor
Marketization 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.004
[0.276] [0.295] [1.000] [0.182] [0.596] [0.479]
Number of observations 18,221 41,031 357,806 71,560 71,557 71,564
R2 0.131 0.143 0.090 0.097 0.105 0.083
Panel C: determinants of short-term debt, grouped by ﬁrm size
Firm characteristics
Firm size 0.002 0.006* 0.010*** 0.004 0.003 0.024***
[0.719] [0.095] [0.000] [0.492] [0.596] [0.000]
Proﬁtability 0.484*** 0.499*** 0.203*** 0.177*** 0.277*** 0.302***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Asset tangibility 0.272*** 0.234*** 0.259*** 0.269*** 0.270*** 0.252***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Asset maturity 0.001 0.006 0.018 0.001 0.011*** 0.009
[0.405] [0.190] [0.133] [0.819] [0.000] [0.122]
Industry concentration 0.550 0.213 0.502 0.047 0.762* 0.551
[0.370] [0.633] [0.170] [0.926] [0.063] [0.227]
Industry median 0.675*** 0.556*** 0.451*** 0.408*** 0.494*** 0.469***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Ownership structures
State ownership 0.014* 0.003 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.026
[0.070] [0.800] [0.499] [0.712] [0.908] [0.103]
Foreign ownership 0.045*** 0.096*** 0.104*** 0.083*** 0.115*** 0.119***
[0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
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6. Conclusions
In this paper, we ﬁrst show that ﬁrm characteristics that are found to affect the capital structure decisions of public-listed
ﬁrms in developed countries appear to have similar effects on the debt ﬁnancing decisions of non-listed ﬁrms in China.
Moreover, we show that ownership structures and the quality of the institutional framework clearly matter in explaining
Chinese ﬁrms’ capital structure policies. State ownership is positively associated with leverage and ﬁrms’ access to long-term
debt, while ﬁrm foreign ownership is negatively associated with all of our measures of leverage. Firms in better developed
regions are found to be associated with a lower likelihood of employing long-term debt, suggesting the availability of alter-
native ﬁnancing channels and a tightening of lending standards under the banking reform. The combination of ownership
and institutional factors explains up to one-third (one-half) of the total variation in leverage (access to long-term debt) deci-
sions. Further, we present fresh evidence on the interaction between ownership structures and institutions in affecting cap-
ital structure decisions: state ownership is only signiﬁcantly and positively associated with total and short-term debt in less
Table 5 (continued)
Large Medium Small Small
Quintile 5 Quintile 3 Quintile 1
Institutional factor
Marketization 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.012* 0.007 0.006
[0.693] [0.511] [0.161] [0.062] [0.304] [0.298]
Number of observations 18,221 41,031 357,806 71,560 71,557 71,564
R2 0.119 0.106 0.099 0.107 0.111 0.096
Panel D: explaining the probability of having long-term debt, grouped by ﬁrm size
Firm characteristics
Firm size 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.056*** 0.030*** 0.018***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.003]
Proﬁtability 0.359*** 0.473*** 0.097** 0.117** 0.081 0.042
[0.001] [0.000] [0.033] [0.025] [0.132] [0.416]
Asset tangibility 0.208*** 0.227*** 0.195*** 0.255*** 0.178*** 0.164***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Asset maturity 0.013* 0.011 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.049***
[0.051] [0.163] [0.339] [0.534] [0.472] [0.000]
Industry concentration 4.307*** 3.002*** 2.101*** 2.515*** 2.420*** 0.870
[0.006] [0.001] [0.007] [0.000] [0.006] [0.402]
Industry average frequency 0.168* 0.380*** 0.494*** 0.512*** 0.579*** 0.318***
[0.060] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Ownership structures
State ownership 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.098*** 0.044** 0.080*** 0.098***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.016] [0.000] [0.000]
Foreign ownership 0.446*** 0.383*** 0.172*** 0.194*** 0.172*** 0.175***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Institutional factor
Marketization 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.027*** 0.039*** 0.043***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Number of observations 18,221 41,031 357,806 71,560 71,557 71,564
Pseudo R2 0.201 0.116 0.064 0.061 0.067 0.064
This table reports results from regressions of capital structure variables on ﬁrm characteristics, and ownership and institutional variables, grouped by ﬁrm
size. Our sample contains the population of manufacturing ﬁrms tracked by the NBS for the period 2000–2004. We drop observations with negative values
of total assets, total liabilities, and sales, and winsorize all ﬁrm-level variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. Our ﬁnal sample has 417,068
ﬁrm-year observations. There are three ﬁrm size categories: large, medium, and small. We further divide the small size category into ﬁve groups according
to sales quintiles. LEV is measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. STD is the ratio of short-term liabilities over total assets. The LTD dummy
is set equal to one if the ﬁrm has long-term liabilities, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of annual sales measured in millions of 2003
RMB Yuan. Proﬁtability is earnings before tax divided by total assets adjusted by the industry median. Asset tangibility is total ﬁxed assets divided by total
assets. Asset maturity is the sum of (current assets/total assets)  (current assets/cost of goods sold) and (ﬁxed assets/total assets)  (ﬁxed assets/
depreciation), divided by 1000. Industry-level leverage measures are based on 2-digit SIC code and computed yearly. Industry concentration is the
Herﬁndahl index using ﬁrm sales. State ownership is the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by the state. Foreign ownership is the fraction of paid-in-
capital contributed by foreign investors. The marketization index captures the regional institutional development and is from Fan andWang (2004). The Fan
and Wang data is available for 1998–1999 and 2001–2002. We use the average of the 1999 and 2001 indices for our ﬁrms in 2000, and use the values of
2002 indices for our ﬁrms in years 2002–2004. Year dummies are included in each regression but not reported. The reported P-values, below the coefﬁcient
estimates in brackets, are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted to account for possible correlation within a province
cluster. Panel A reports the summary statistics for different size sub-samples. Mean and median (in parenthesis) are reported. Panel B presents the
regression results using LEV as the dependent variable. Panel C presents the regression results using STD as the dependent variable. Panel D reports the
marginal effects of a probit regression using the LTD dummy as the dependent variable.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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developed regions. Finally, we show that state-owned ﬁrms’ easy access to long-term debt is positively associated with long-
term investment and negatively associated with ﬁrm performance.
Our paper has the following policy implications. First, it provides evidence that non-listed Chinese ﬁrms employ too much
short-term debt. Second, the paper shows that state ownership has an important role in ﬁnancial leverage, and that better
institutional development limits the role of state ownership in Chinese ﬁrms’ capital structure decisions. Third, the results
suggest that, in the course of current banking reforms, banks have begun to apply economic criteria to a greater extent in
their lending decisions. Nonetheless, effective policies are called for to lengthen debt maturity for all ﬁrms. Finally, policies
that encourage the development of Chinese stock markets will help to diversify funding needs and hence facilitate the bank-
ing reform.
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Appendix A
The marketization index is compiled by the National Economic Research Institute (Fan and Wang, 2004), a comprehensive
index that captures the regional market development of the following aspects:
(1) Relationship between government and markets:
a. The role of markets in allocating resources using the ratio of government spending to GDP.
b. The level of tax burden on rural residents using the ratio of farmer families’ tax bills to their annual income.
c. The role of government in business using the ratio of total hours ﬁrmmanagers spent dealing with government and
government ofﬁcials to their total working hours.
d. The level of enterprise burden in addition to normal taxes using the ratio of non-tax levies to sales.
e. The size of government using the ratio of employment by the central and local government, and various social orga-
nizations to population.
(2) Development of nonstate sector in the economy:
a. The ratio of industrial output by the private sector to total industrial output.
b. The ratio of capital investment by the private sector to total capital investment.
c. The ratio of employment by the private sector to total employment.
(3) Development of product markets:
a. The extent to which prices are set by market demand andsupply.
i. The extent to which prices of retail merchandises are set by market demand and supply.
ii. The extent to which prices of production factors are set by market demand and supply.
iii. The extent to which prices of farm products are set by market demand and supply.
b. The extent of regional trade barriers using the ratio of number of trade barriers to GDP.
(4) Development of factor markets:
a. Banking development.
i. Competitiveness of the banking sector using the ratio of deposits taken by non-state ﬁnancial institutions to
total deposits.
ii. The extent to which banks employ economic criteria in their capital allocation using the ratio of short-term loans
to the non-state sector (such as agricultural loans, loans to village/township enterprises, loans to private enter-
prises, and loans to foreign-owned enterprises) to total short-term loans.
b. Foreign direct investment (FDI) using the ratio of FDI to GDP.
c. Mobility of labor using the ratio of employment provided by migrant workers to total employment.
d. Commercialization of technological innovation using the ratio of volume of technological transfers to employment
by the technology sector.
(5) Development of market intermediaries and legal environment:
a. Development of marketintermediaries.
i. The ratio of number of lawyers to population.
ii. The ratio of registered accountants to population.
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b. Protection of producers’ legal rights using the ratio of number of economic crimes to GDP.
c. Protection of property rights.
i. The average number of patents applied per engineer.
ii. The average number of patents approved per engineer.
d. Protection of consumer rights using the ratio of number of consumer complaints received by the Consumer Asso-
ciation to GDP.
In summary, the marketization index consists of 23 components. The year of 1999 is used as the base year, and the min-
imum and maximum values for each component are speciﬁed to be 0 and 10, respectively. Values of each component in
other years are normalized by the corresponding base year values. The ﬁnal marketization index is an arithmetic average
of these 23 components. It is worth noting that using the principal components analysis to determine the weights on each
of the 23 components leads to no major difference in the relative ranking of regions (Fan and Wang, 2004).
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